Ski Area Safety Act Opinion

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT ISSUES

Ski Area Safety Act Opinion

Anderson v. Pine Knob Ski Resort - Michigan Supreme Court
Docket No. 121587 (July 2003)

In Anderson, Plaintiff, a member of the high school varsity ski team, collided with the "timing shack" at the end of the race course during a high school race. He suffered lacerations to his face, arm, leg and broke several bones and teeth. Defendant, Pine Knob, filed it's Motion for Summary Disposition pursuant to the Ski Area Safety Act (SASA) contending it was immune from premises- liability claims by recreational skiers pursuant to the provisions of the SASA. The Trial Court denied Defendant's Motion ruling that the claims fell outside the immunity granted by the SASA. On appeal, Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's Application for Leave to Appeal. 467 Mich 897 (202).

In analyzing the SASA, the Supreme Court first noted that skiers are held to have accepted certain types of risks from dangers that inhere in the sport as long as those dangers are "obvious and necessary." Supreme Court identified two types of dangers inherent to the sport, which it categorized as "natural hazards" and "unnatural hazards". Natural hazards were noted to include without limitation "variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees and other forms of natural growth or debris..." MCLA 408.342(2). The unnatural hazards include "collisions with ski lift towers and their components, with other skiers or with properly marked or plainly visible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment." MCLA 408.342(2) Noteworthy, the Court observed that the hazards identified in the statute were clearly only examples of necessary dangers which the legislature intended as risks held to be assumed by the skier.

With the above analysis, the Court reviewed the facts of the Anderson case and adopted the Defendant's argument in the Court of Appeals Opinion that the timing shack constituted an obvious and necessary unnatural hazard the collision with which was an inherent risk and assumed by the skier, the minor Plaintiff. In explaining it's application of the facts to the law, the Court recognized that timing equipment is essential to ski racing and that such timing equipment requires protection from the elements. They rejected the Plaintiff's arguments adopted by the Court of Appeals (now reversed) that the timing shack was larger or more forgiving than other alternatives might have been. As the Supreme Court explained, "...once hazards fall within the covered category, only if their unnecessary or not obvious, is the ski operator liable." The Supreme Court further recognized that adopting the standard urged by Plaintiff would deprive the statute of certainty the legislation was to create concerning liability risks. It is further noted that under the Plaintiff's proposed interpretation of the statute, after any accident, rather than immunity should suit be brought, the ski area operators would be engaged in the same inquire that would have been under taken if there had been no statute ever enacted. Such an interpretation as proposed by Plaintiff would of course, render the statute meaningless.

The Supreme Court's decision in Anderson should be very instructive for future cases involving Roller Skating Centers and interpretation of the Roller Skating Safety Act (RSSA), as the statutes' assumption of risk provisions providing for immunity are similar. Anderson now provides a bright line interpretation of the assumption of risk provision of the SASA (and, therefore, arguably the RSSA) in that once a hazard is identified as within the covered category [obvious and necessary], the ski area operator [or rink operator] is not liable in the event of an injury resulting from such a risk.